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THE ETHICS OF SPINOZA 
OR a century after his death, Spinoza’s name was F anathema, and the accounts of his philosophy taxed 
the lexicon of vituperation. Then in the German Enlighten- 
ment and Romanticism, abuse yielded to admiration; the 
erstwhile atheist and impostor became the “God-intoxicated 
man,” and Spinozism almost a synonym for philosophy. 
Though in the course of the last hundred years this cult 
of Spinoza has yielded to more thorough if less worshipful 
appreciation, he has not been ‘explained’ or ‘placed,’ nor 
his system reduced to a formula: a mark of the vitality no 
less than of the subtle complexity of his thought. Most 
variously interpreted of all the great thinkers of the seven- 
teenth century, Spinoza reflects or rather integrates in 
critical creative synthesis the many fertile strains of his 
age. Thus he aroused immediately various partisan reac- 
tions, and ever since has tempted special pleaders, only to 
disappoint them in the end. 
Ideas were living forces to Spinoza, forces in living well 
or ill, and this conviction determined his conception of the 
aim of philosophy. Real knowledge is not neutral or passive, 
and Spinoza’s own knowledge was not mere book-learning. 
H e  lived with his library, but not in it. T h e  Theologico- 
Political Treatise is an erudite book, but it is a pioneer 
document of Biblical criticism; its object is to undermine 
bibliolatry of all sorts. Spinoza interrupted his Ethics to 
write this classic of unshackled thinking and to hoist the 
flag of criticism in the very citadel of traditional conformity. 
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T o  enter into the religion of thought and truth, men must 
first be emancipated from the idolatry of words and dogma. 
Three  centuries ago, in 1632, Baruch de Spinoza was 
born in Amsterdam, the descendant of Spanish-Portuguese 
Jews who had escaped to Holland because of religious per- 
secution. Rebelling against Spanish despotism, the Dutch 
provinces had earned their independence and established a 
state of tolerance. From all parts of Europe those who 
chafed under oppression came to the Netherlands: energy 
and intelligence of a high order were a t  the service of 
free institutions. T h a t  the Dutch had any special liking 
for the Jews or  invited them to immigrate, does not appear 
to have been the case; but they came anyhow; they settled 
and prospered, and by the time of Spinoza a considerable 
Jewish colony had grown in Amsterdam. While not alto- 
gether lacking in intelligent leadership, they were as a rule 
clannish: their new freedom seemed to have made them 
the more bigoted. 
As soon as Spinoza’s mental abilities were recognized, 
the rabbis had their eyes on him; but it was not long before 
he became a source of great worry to the orthodox. Quick 
to understand exposition of doctrine, he was as quick to 
criticize; rabbinical reasoning was apt to crumble under his 
probing; nor was he satisfied with Biblical and Talmudic 
studies. A new science and a new philosophy were stirring 
the world: these he wanted to know, but for  this purpose 
he had to learn Latin, the language of the Catholic oppres- 
sors of his race. So the most brilliant and learned young 
mind in the Amsterdam synagogue seemed bound to abandon 
Jewish orthodoxy. Could he be headed off? T h e  rabbis 
and elders tried admonition and bargaining first. They 
offered him a stipend of one thousand florins, on the condi- 
tion that  he remain outwardly conformist and attend the 
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synagogue with fair regularity. This rabbinical inducement 
Spinoza rejected with calm disdain; but the effort to buy 
his silence confirmed him in the decision to which he had 
been tending, to leave the synagogue. The  attempt of a 
fanatic to assassinate him put this resolution into effect: 
he left the city and retired to one of the suburbs. T h e  
Amsterdam congregation thereupon excommunicated him 
and cast him off as an unbeliever. 
Spinoza proceeded to establish himself as a scholar and 
a grinder of lenses; the craft nourished his interest in optics, 
and besides offered him an opportunity to think while work- 
ing. H i s  philosophical studies brought him in touch with 
liberal groups in Holland and with some of the best minds 
in Europe. H e  devoted particular attention to the rational- 
istic philosophy and scientific method of Reni Descartes. 
This new rationalism satisfied, but it also challenged his 
own demand for  intellectual clarity. Here was a method 
aiming a t  demonstration, not leaning on dogmatic authority, 
not content with probability, bent on conclusiveness. Yet i t  
was unconvincing. Its analysis of Nature could not get 
beyond an ambiguous dualism of mind and body on the one 
hand and of these and God on the other. Such a theory of 
reality Spinoza could not accept as the final science and 
philosophy. 
We should keep in mind from the outset the ethical 
motivation of Spinoza’s philosophy. H e  seeks a scientific 
method, but his purpose is more properly described as moral- 
religious. H e  does not pursue knowledge for its own sake, 
but as enlightenment, that he may find his path and keep 
to it. W e  should not be misled by Spinoza’s deliberate and 
insistent naturalistic method into confusing him with the 
naturalists in aim. T h e  spur to his search after truth is 
not the Aristotelian: “All men by nature desire to know.” 
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Spinoza’s philosophy issues from a spiritual emergency : 
“I perceived that I was in a state of great peril, and I 
compelled myself to seek with all my strength for a remedy, 
however uncertain it might be; as a sick man struggling 
with a deadly disease, when he sees that death will surely 
be upon him unless a remedy is found. . . .” This urgent 
character of Spinoza’s thought makes the title of his crown- 
ing work, the Ethics, no accident, as it certainly is not a mis- 
nomer. H i s  entire thought points to an Ethics as its apex. 
Witness the themes of his other treatises, finished and un- 
finished: On God,  M a n ,  and H i s  Well-Being;  On the  
Improvement  of the  Understanding; O n  Theology and 
Politics; On Politics: these are so many programs of indi- 
vidual and social reform through enlightenment. Even the 
H e b r e w  Grammar  has a practical aim: the more complete 
diagnosis and cure of bibliolatry and intolerance. Spinoza’s 
philosophy would map the way to the blessed life: wherein 
and how is human perfection to be found, the obstacles to 
it, and the surmounting of the obstacles. 
But if ethics is to be the fruit of Spinoza’s philosophy, 
its roots must rest in the soil of a true doctrine of nature. 
T h e  great emergency makes him doubly cautious. H e  needs 
the truth, and so must have the facts. Perfection through 
understanding means that ethics must be based on meta- 
physics and physics. T o  perceive truly man’s path to per- 
fection, understanding of human nature is required, and 
to know human nature truly, we must know man’s place 
in nature, and so the nature and constitution of all things. 
Whereas common opinion or imagination perceives things 
in random confusion, rational knowledge discloses order, 
necessary connection, and ultimate unity. If we only think, 
we are bound to recognize that there can be only one ultimate 
World-Principle or Substance, infinite, eternal, self-deter- 
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mined. W e  may call it God, o r  we may call it Nature:  
fundamental ground and being of all that  there is. Its 
boundless plenitude of reality must involve or include an 
infinitude of aspects or  attributes, each attribute character- 
istically constituting its essence. Two  such attributes we 
perceive, matter and mind. Nature is thus both extended 
body and thinking mind. Matter and mind are not two 
parts or  two types, but two aspects or versions of the one 
world-order. There  cannot be, therefore, any interaction 
between them, but the two attributes o r  aspects of the one 
substance are thoroughly parallel o r  corresponding to  each 
other. All that exists is a state or  modification of the one 
uItimate Nature, extended or  thinking. Look a t  the world 
on the surface only, and you see random variety and lumping 
of particulars ; but see more deeply into the heart of things, 
and you will perceive them all as waves in and of the one 
ocean. Their true being is Nature, and this integral being 
of them all is the true nature of each. They are what they 
are ultimately in God, and their character is thus eternally 
determined. 
Of decisive and far-reaching importance, as even the 
briefest statement of Spinoza’s metaphysics shows, is the 
thoroughly naturalistic doctrine of universal necessity. T h e  
God-Substance is the infinite source and ground of all things, 
but not in the sense of its creatively willing them. Things 
are not what they are because God so wills them. T h e  
expression God or  Nature is here crucial. God is Nature 
for Spinoza, the infinite cosmic order. All that is or  takes 
place manifests the eternal necessity of nature. There is 
no chance or  arbitrariness or  spontaneity in the cosmos. 
T h e  idea of freedom is due to a confusion: ignorant of 
the causes of our actions, we imagine them undetermined. 
As well might a roof-tile falling to the ground imagine 
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itself as having a free adventure. All things are uncondi- 
tionally as they must be, o r  better, they are what they are. 
With the utter exclusion of all chance or cosmic alterna- 
tive, this doctrine likewise rules out all design in nature. 
I t  is not a matter of chance nor is it a matter of choice or  
preference or purpose that the sum of the angles in a triangle 
is what it is. So all that  exists follows necessarily from God’s 
infinite essence : itself eternally self-determined. T h e  phrase 
‘self-determined’ here should not mislead us. All that a 
triangle or  a tree o r  a traitor are or  do, reveals their 
respective natures and is in that sense self-determined, that  
is, would be different only if they were something else. God’s 
self-determination likewise expresses the necessary eternal 
self-manifestation of infinite nature. Reality is a structure 
available for analysis, and as we thus learn what things are 
or  are not, we realize that the terms ‘should’ or  ‘ought,’ 
praise or  blame, regret or  preference have no real place 
in the cosmos. T h e  whole vocabulary of evaluation, perfec- 
tion or  the reverse in all its forms, has meaning only and 
always in relation to a particular demand necessarily char- 
acteristic of a particular nature. Meat  is good for the 
hungry and drink for  the thirsty and a boat for the ship- 
wrecked mariner, and all things are good for him whom 
they suit or  to whom they are useful. But that any of these 
things are really good or  bad is an unwarrantable addi- 
tion of our own. “In Nature there is no good and no evil;” 
all things simply are what they are, and the better we 
understand, the more content we are with understanding. 
T o  blame a man because he cannot see this alleged beauty 
o r  ugliness, or  this so-called perfection or  ignominy, is as 
if we were to  blame a blind man because he cannot see. All 
perception and reaction are relative to the perceiver’s nature. 
H a d  you the eyes of a sculptor, you would see the beauty 
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of the hand, but “the most beautiful hand when seen through 
a microscope will appear horrible.” Instead, therefore, of 
mistakenly ascribing to God the value-distinctions which are 
always relative to our particular selves, we are enabled by 
our understanding to perceive evaluation as well as all 
other reactions as necessary manifestations of specific nature, 
and thus as ultimately manifestations of the whole. But as 
we thus perceive the truth, we realize that Nature is not to 
be praised or  blamed either ultimately or in detail, but both 
ultimately and in detail is to be analyzed and understood. 
This in particular is to characterize the intelligent study of 
human nature. The  philosopher who had begun his study 
from urgent spiritual need, has learned and would teach 
us this wisdom of dispassionate objective naturalism. This 
he sets as a principle of procedure before himself in his 
treatment of human nature, individual and social. In the 
Introduction to his Political Treatise and at  the beginning 
of Third Pa r t  of the Ethics, Spinoza records his resolution : 
“Not  to mock, lament, or execrate, but to understand human 
actions. . . . Nothing comes to  pass in nature, which can 
be set as a flaw therein; for nature is always the same, and 
everywhere one and the same in her efficacy and power of 
action. . . . Thus the passions of hatred, anger, envy, and 
so on, considered in themselves, follow from this same neces- 
sity and efficacy of nature: . . . I shall, therefore, treat 
of the nature and strength of the emotions according to 
the same method. . . . I shall consider human actions and 
desires in exactly the same manner, as though I were con- 
cerned with lines, planes, and solids.” 
Is this only a sober resolution to abstain from moralizing, 
or is it a view of human nature which affects the very possi- 
bility of ethics? T h e  fuller implications of this principle 
are disclosed in Spinoza’s geometry of the passions, a 
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doctrine which has remained a classic to this day. W e  shall 
not here rehearse it in any detail, but shall consider i t  only 
in its ethical corollaries. 
In  common with all things in nature, man is moved to 
persist in his own being. This persistence is not any occult 
endowment, but simply the distinctive nature of the person 
or  thing in question. A man’s way of self-preservation 
manifests a man’s character and place and relation to other 
objects : for the perfection of a man, or of a hatchet, Spinoza 
observes, is in each “serving God,” that is, in each playing 
its respective d e ,  whatever it be. A molecule persists in 
its being as long as in its nature it can, and so does a man, 
but a man is conscious of his endeavor and persistence. 
This endeavor, mentally regarded, we call will; taking ac- 
count of body and mind together, we call the endeavor 
appetite, and the appetite with the consciousness of itself, 
desire. Will, appetite, desire are not determined by, but 
themselves determine our judgments of good and evil. I t  is 
not because we deem a thing good that we desire it, but on 
the contrary it is because we desire it that we deem it good : a 
bold glance ahead across centuries of psychological analysis. 
T h e  actual persistence of a thing, its effective self-main- 
tenance, is its power, and, Spinoza adds, that  is its virtue. 
“By virtue and power I mean the same thing.” When we 
speak of a yeast or  of a medicine as having lost its virtue, 
we express the right meaning of the term, which we should 
retain in our treatment of man. “If the salt have lost its 
savour ( that  is, its saltiness, its power, its virtue) where- 
with shall it be salted?” I n  our relation to the rest of nature, 
we are affected, body and mind, by other things, persistence 
clashing with persistence. Self-maintenance and expansion, 
with the consciousness thereof, or  else the sense of being 
curbed and in a measure undone, are primary experiences. 
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These two, Pleasure and Pain, with Desire, Spinoza regards 
as the basic elements of our passions. As virtue is synony- 
mous with power, so perfection is self-maintenance and rise 
in power, and pleasure, an emotion whereby the mind rises 
t o  a greater perfection; pain is the reverse. 
W e  may say that desire is vital drive in a man, and 
pleasure or pain the sense of heightened or  lowered vitality. 
Pleasure thus regarded is always good, and pain always 
bad. This view guides Spinoza’s further account and 
classification of the emotions. Pleasure and pain accom- 
panied by the idea of an external cause are love or hate 
respectively. W e  try to imagine, to anticipate, or  to keep 
in mind whatever enhances our vitality; by association or  
imagination a variety of emotions arise which he defines 
or explains: hope, confidence, joy, on the one hand, and on 
the other, fear, despair, disappointment ; approval and 
indignation ; sympathy and envy; complacency and humility, 
honor and shame, and so forth. 
T h e  application of Spinoza’s initial principles leads to 
some estimates perplexing to traditional moral judgment 
and points to his program of moral reform through en- 
lightenment. Thus pity, he thinks, is in itself bad, and so 
are remorse and repentance, and likewise humility : in them 
all men are rendered wretched or  infirm, and pain in itself 
is always evil. But pleasure, while in itself good, may be 
due to an idea of rising perfection or  vitality, which the 
facts of life do not bear out. Man may be miserable because 
of his failure to see things in their proper setting or  relation, 
or he may pleasantly imagine himself prosperous when he 
is actually on the path to ruin. 
Such is the nature of passion, furthermore, that it may 
take entire possession of a man. An emotion or  passion 
expresses our own power and persistent self-maintenance, 
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but also the power of other things acting on us. This  power 
of other things may so overwhelm or  usurp a man’s attention 
as to yield a distorted view of oneself in relation to other 
things. A man’s whole being, as a result, may flame up in 
anger or  jealousy or  overweening vainglory as the case may 
be. This is indeed the usual course of human passion, and 
recognizing it, men have proposed heroic remedies. Most 
radical is the Stoic program of utter repression of emotion, 
the ideal of apathy, passionless reasonable existence. But 
this proposed remedy reflects a mistaken idea of our con- 
stitution. In  view of what has been observed already, a 
complete extinction of the emotions would register, not 
the victory of the intellect, but its own extinction of activity 
in relation with the body. Man’s very life and being is a 
tissue and a course of emotions; mind and body cooperate 
or  rather reflect each other in the counterplay of passions. 
T h e  contest, therefore, is always a contest of emotions. T h e  
remedy, if remedy there be, cannot consist in the action of 
reason on passion directly, to subdue or  repress it altogether. 
T h e  action can only be that of an idea on an idea. And pre- 
cisely here we should be reminded that the passion which a 
thing may be said to arouse in us essentially springs from a 
certain view or  idea which we have of that thing. Change our 
idea of that thing, and our emotional state or passion also 
changes. T h e  action of the mind whereby one idea prevails 
over another is thus not the mastery of thought over emo- 
tion, but the replacement of one emotion by another. Under- 
stand a passion, that  is, perceive the idea of which it is the 
emotional correspondent, and it ceases to be a passion: the 
emotion of the other prevailing idea has replaced it. If 
there is to be a moral reform and perfection of man,-some- 
thing of which Spinoza initially felt the need gravely, but 
regarding the meaning of which in his philosophy we are 
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yet t o  be informed,-it cannot be by the Stoic plan of apathy 
but through some enlightenment which replaces inadequate 
by more adequate emotions. If the moral outlook of man 
has thus revealed the range of passion, moral progress 
would seem to involve its culture. 
But are we warranted by Spinoza in using the terms re- 
form and progress a t  all, and is not the expression ‘perfec- 
tion of man’ now being charged with a significance for which 
we have not been prepared, and which indeed Spinoza’s 
naturalism seems to rule out?  H o w  is Spinoza’s reason to 
explain to itself the nature of the good for which it now 
seeks provision in nature? In  other words, though Spinoza 
deliberately set out in pursuit of ethics, what ethics, if any, 
is he to attain or  afford in terms of his cosmology? 
W e  have now come to what is for us the crucial issue in 
Spinoza’s philosophy. T h a t  it imposes this issue by its 
thoroughness and integrity of procedure is one of its chief 
merits. Spinoza has been lauded as standing “supreme and 
almost unique in that, within the sweep of a naturalistic 
metaphysic, he yet found room for all that is highest and 
best in man.” I t  is important to understand what highest 
and best could signify in Spinozism. 
On the level of common opinion or imagination on which 
most men live their lives, what can these terms or any moral 
standards mean ? The  plaything or  battle-ground of passion 
and external influences, subject to prejudices, and the victim 
of partialities neither thought out nor harmonized, the 
usual life of men lacks order, or if it has it, the order is 
unreasonable and spurious, bigotry stubborn yet unreliable. 
This is human servitude. W e  can describe it in terms which 
connote condemnation, but i f  we objectively regard men 
as living and active on that level, what would justify either 
praise or condemnation of their behavior? True, men on 
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this level imagine or opine that some things are good for 
them and others bad. But each passion as understood by 
reason is laid alongside the others on the same level plane 
of factual necessity: nature being always and everywhere 
the same and acting with the same efficacy. In the life of 
passion there are intense likes and dislikes, but no defensible 
preference and therefore no moral judgment. 
T h e  vital impulse and effort a t  self-preservation grows 
into avid and unreasoning selfishness. It makes men rivals 
and enemies, as Hobbes had already noted. On a clear day 
the ailing Spinoza would step down into the sunny court of 
his lodgings, and catching a fly would put it into a spider’s 
web to  watch the ensuing struggle and to  meditate on the 
similar lives of men,-flies and spiders struggling in the web 
of existence. T h e  fear of harm is stronger than the desire to  
harm, and so men submit for the sake of security. This  is the 
way in which most men conform to political authority, and 
this counsel of submission is the most immediate remedy 
which the disorder of the life of passion requires. Legality 
is, as it were, morality pro tern., keeping the peace by hold- 
ing men in bounds, by a system of statutes and customs and 
institutions, like reins or blinders, to limit and direct the 
daily course of life. Theological creeds and ecclesiastic re- 
gimes serve the same end, imposing order on those who 
otherwise would lack it. So Goethe has summed it up for 
Spinoza in a pithy stanza : 
H e  who possesses art and science, 
Has  also religion; 
H e  who these two does not possess, 
Does need a religion. 
The  state and the church, which curb lawless men, may 
and do also shackle men of intelligence. In individual and in 
social life, in action, speech and thought, Spinoza cham- 
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pioned a regime of tolerance, so that men capable of rising 
above the anarchy of passion into the republic of reason may 
not be hindered from so doing. This great advantage to  the 
individual would redound to  the state, which would thus have 
not only subjects but also citizens. 
On the level of opinion in the life of passion there can be 
no real moral activity. This, according to Spinoza, is the 
achievement of reason in the enlightened life. H o w  and 
wherein does enlightenment attain to  moral values? T h e  an- 
swer requires explicit recognition of Spinoza’s distinction 
between passive and active emotion. In vulgar passion the 
mind is acted upon by external factors which it does not 
understand adequately; it is thus passive, and its emotion is 
rightly called passion. When a man attains an adequate idea 
of whatever may be engaging him, in seeing things as they 
are and his relation to  them in nature, his emotion expresses 
his characteristic activity in the circumstances; we may well 
call it not passion but action. As our fragmentary and con- 
fused impressions, through rational enlightenment, become 
clear and adequate, our passion ceases to be a passion and be- 
comes an active emotion. Thanks to  intelligence, we are no 
longer imposed on (in both senses of that  term),  but gain a 
larger measure of self-possession through self-understanding, 
that  is, active self-expression. 
T o  have an adequate idea of anything and so to be truly 
active with respect to that thing, means to  see the relation of 
that  thing and of ourselves in Nature. W e  see things clearly 
and adequately as we see them in their cosmic setting, in their 
universal context, or as Spinoza puts it, in the light or under 
the pattern of eternity. Intelligence is understanding of the 
order of Nature and the vision of things in their necessary 
r61e and relation therein. T h e  very perception of the cosmic- 
ally necessary inspires reasonableness. As we recognize the 
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eternal order of things, we are emancipated from confused 
petulance into the clear serenity of reason. From nai’ve pro- 
vincialism we grow into philosophic cosmic citizenship. Our 
whole thought is pervaded by the certainty of the perfect 
God-Substance in which and of which all things are. This 
serene exalted perfection of rational insight Spinoza calls the 
intellectual, that  is to say the understanding love of God. 
This gradual thorough possession of human life by reason 
has important practical consequences. T h e  effort a t  self- 
preservation in the life of ignorance and passion, as we have 
seen, makes us avidly grasp or resist things external to our- 
selves, quite confused and uncomprehending as to  what is 
happening to us. Man  is selfish, but he does not understand 
himself or  his interests, and his greed is thus unavailing. As 
we gain in intelligence, we come to perceive what it is all 
about, and so our own appropriate demand, province, pros- 
pect, activity. But as we thus rationally find ourselves in the 
cosmos, we no longer as before find others in our way. T o  
the pursuer of truth every other pursuer is a fellow-seeker. 
T h e  sharing in wisdom and reasonableness makes all men 
free comrades. T h e  emotional life of an actively intelligent 
man Spinoza calls a life of fortitude, distinguishing in i t  cour- 
age and generosity, rational self-preservation and sober- 
mindedness, and friendly cooperation. T h e  socially cement- 
ing power of generous intelligence is pointed out in the 
Ethics : “Minds are conquered not by arms, but by love and 
magnanimity.’’ Man  alone of all things in the world has a 
unique claim on man. All else we may use, preserve or  de- 
stroy as suits our need. Human beings alone have a dignity 
which we are bound to respect. N o r  does a rational man de- 
sire for himself anything by way of exclusive privilege, but 
all his demands are such as admit of being universalized. A 
rational man needs nothing more than a society of reason- 
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able men, and in it alone can live in real concord. St. John 
had reported the words of Jesus: ‘‘Ye shall know the truth, 
and the truth shall make you free.’’ Spinoza might well have 
added: “Ye shall know the truth, and the truth shall make 
you one.” 
On the principle of self-preservation in the higher, ra- 
tional sense, enlightened men will thus seek to  secure a larger 
promise of enlightenment for others by advocating and work- 
ing for a system of social, religious, and political freedom 
and tolerance. “Since there is no single thing we know which 
is more excellent than a man who is guided by reason, it fol- 
lows that there is nothing by which a person can better show 
how much skill and talent he possesses than by so educating 
men that a t  last they will live under the direct authority of 
reason.” Spinoza’s works are classics in the philosophy of lib- 
eralism and democracy, and of joyous freedom through the 
discipline of intelligence. The  actions of the sage are not 
motivated by the fear of evil or punishment, but by clear per- 
ception of the good and wholehearted adoption of it, “ H e  
who acts rightly from the true knowledge and love of right, 
acts with freedom and constancy, whereas he who acts from 
fear of evil, is under the constraint of evil, and acts in bond- 
age under external control.” As man comes to recognize his 
own realization in the life of knowledge and truth, this vir- 
tue of active reasonableness needs no other reward, itself 
being blessed. A life thus ordered is not poisoned by futile 
worries or useless regrets; no impatience or  indignation with 
the ignorant multitude, no lamenting over bodily ills; in the 
clear perception of the cosmic order the entire life of the wise 
man is active, positive, constructive, serene. “A free man 
thinks of nothing less than of death, and his wisdom is not a 
meditation upon death but upon life.” T h e  virtues of rea- 
sonableness, the quest and the possession of truth are self- 
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rewarding whether there be an eternity for the individual or  
not. About immortality in the more traditional sense, Spi- 
noza has little to say, but there is an eternity of which he is 
assured : the eternity of the purely rational unity of man with 
God in the possession and love of the truth. 
This was not only an ethical theory which Spinoza was ex- 
pounding, but the active principle by which he lived his own 
life. H i s  daily career, private and public, has the rounded 
consistency of a circle, the particular acts like radii all issuing 
from or  pointing to the same center of rationality. In what 
other philosopher is there less to blame or condone or ex- 
plain away? A synagogue conclave seeks to induce him to 
make his life a lie for a thousand florins; failing in this, the 
elders of the congregation anathematize him; a fanatic tries 
to assassinate him; Spinoza waves no red rags nor yet raises 
the white flag, but withdraws to grind his lenses and to think 
the ideas that are to be his answer and to  win the long day 
for  him. After his father’s death, a rapacious sister uses his 
excommunication as a pretext to deprive him of his share in 
his patrimony. This threat to justice Spinoza resists, goes to 
law, wins his case ; but, the principle of right once established, 
he does not claim his share of the estate, keeping only one 
bed as a visible proof of reaffirmed justice. H e  declines the 
offers of French grandees to  secure the profitable goodwill 
of Louis XIV by dedicating a book to him; and distrustful, 
he does not a t  first consent to have his unpublished Ethics 
communicated to Leibniz, who had gone to France on a mis- 
sion suspected by Spinoza to threaten the prospects of 
religious tolerance in Europe. But he is ready to write treat- 
ises especially for  humble students of philosophy who seek 
the truth, and to correspond a t  length with obscure strangers 
who ask for enlightenment from him. A professorship a t  
Heidelberg is offered him ; he declines the honor, uncertain 
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of the degree of freedom or  the likely interference with his 
own studies which the post might involve. Great Hollanders 
and rich press upon him funds and endowments; he is reluc- 
tant to accept, and what he does take goes largely for  prec- 
ious volumes needed in his studies. H i s  Theologico- Political 
Treatise undermines the basis of traditional orthodoxy, but 
he addresses himself explicitly to those who can think critic- 
ally, to  philosophical readers. T h e  rest he asks not to read 
his book. H e  practices the tolerance which he advocates; he 
does not deride the simple faith of his landlady, but assures 
her that  she will indeed be saved; he does not upset tender 
minds which are not capable of grasping his critical ideas. 
There is in him no envy, no jealousy, no rancor, no pretense. 
H e  spends his days in the seclusion of his room, yet converses 
profitably with great minds and simple. Though he does not 
himself cultivate, yet he appreciates for others the cheer and 
gaiety of social life or  the theatre. H e  does not seek the 
smoke and tumult of warriorship; these are not for him; his 
blows for freedom are to be in the realm of thought. But 
when an infuriated mob murders with unspeakable brutality 
the champion of Dutch liberalism, Spinoza’s landlord has to 
use force to  keep him from sallying forth a t  the peril of his 
life in the cause of freedom. H e  writes his masterwork, the 
Ethics, which he believes to  contain the true philosophy, but 
he seems to  care nothing about fame and would have it pub- 
lished anonymously so that his ideas, the truth, may have a 
more impartial and better chance of being considered on 
their merits. A fatal disease is sapping his life, and he knows 
i t ;  he labors unremittingly to  the last to finish his work, prac- 
ticing his precept to  think not of death but of life. On all who 
know him personally he leaves a lasting impression of cour- 
age without bluster, cheerfulness without frivolity, generous 
dignity of spirit, a spirit of crystal truth, serenity, and love. 
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W h o  can read Spinoza’s works or the pages of his life 
without perceiving the lofty morality attained by him in 
theory and in practice? Clearly, one may say, it is possible 
and a fact that  an explicitly naturalistic cosmology may well 
include a noble ethical doctrine individual and social. But 
how is this inclusion accomplished by Spinoza? Is it simply 
a t  the price of consistency, or may we not here trace a deeper 
strain in his philosophy, implied and demanded though not 
explicitly wrought out ? Spinoza’s enlightened serenity, the 
objectivity of the sage, expresses the ever clearer perception 
of the universal necessity in which all things are as they are. 
But is there not something sinister in this sublime benignity? 
W e  are told, T o u t  comprendre c’est tout pardonner. But 
would not Spinoza rather say that to understand all is to 
realize that there is nothing to pardon? T h e  sage with a 
cosmic sense of humor, which is perhaps the essence of philo- 
sophic wisdom, comes to see all the alleged ills and troubles, 
passions and turmoils of men, each in its place as natural 
parts of the Whole. To  see things in the light or  under the 
pattern of eternity, to see things in God o r  Nature, is to see 
them objectively. 
Shall we call this perfect view of things serene, o r  shall we 
call it callous? It would perhaps depend on how seriously 
we take the moral antithesis of good and evil. W e  saw that 
in the life of ignorant opinion and passion there is no real 
good or  evil, though men be moved and troubled by imagined 
goods and ills. In the sight of God, that is in the universal 
order of Nature, things are as they are and there is no flaw 
or  evil ; but this does not mean that all things are good in the 
moral sense of the term. T h a t  there is no flaw or  evil cos- 
mically means simply that things are not other than in their 
nature they can be. Perfection here would correspondingly 
mean things being what they necessarily are, and the term 
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good would accordingly become a synonym for  actual. In  
God’s sight all things are perfect : nothing is something else, 
and everything is itself. 
Can this, then, be the course of enlightenment in Spinoza’s 
ethics, leading us from the petulant self-engrossment in spu- 
rious imagined good and evil to the serene divine realization 
that there is no good to be distinguished from any evil? T h e  
terrified child in Goethe’s ballad sees and hears the Erl-king; 
the father is disturbed that the child fails to see that there is 
nothing to be disturbed about. But in God’s sight the child’s 
terror and the father’s worry alike are as the dry leaves 
stirred by the wind. Moral  insight here paradoxically seems 
to  point to its own transcendence. Spinoza seems to say, I t  
is good to  perceive, beyond imagined good and evil, the eter- 
nal order and actuality of things as they simply are. Full 
spiritual maturity would then involve the outgrowing of the 
moral. Just as legality was seen to be a morality pro tern., 
so morality in turn is only in passing: a stage in the growing 
pains of intelligence, itself the gradual transition from likes 
and dislikes, scruples and preferences, to the serene knowl- 
edge of the actual as necessary. 
There appears no way of avoiding these corollaries if we 
proceed from Spinoza’s explicitly naturalistic cosmology. 
But as we read Spinoza, and in particular the last part  of the 
Ethics, we are bound to realize that he did not intend the 
conclusion just articulated to be the last word of his philoso- 
phy. T o  take morality seriously means not only to maintain 
that it is better for u s  to see things rationally, but that it is 
better for us to see them thus. T h e  doctrine that all things 
are as they are in the universal necessity of nature need not 
imply that all things are on a par. A person may not be to  
blame for not being as wise as another, yet after all, we 
should say, he is not as wise. God or  Nature, while owning 
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him, may yet reverse Touchstone’s apology for Audrey: 
“Mine own, but an ill-favored thing!” T h e  crow sings ac- 
cording to the laws of nature and presumably does his best; 
all the same, the crow is no nightingale. So in the moral 
scale. If the enlightenment which Spinoza advocates is good, 
then ultimately as well as immediately it is not on a par with 
ignorance; it is better, not merely different. 
There is a meaning to the question, W h a t  ought I to  do?  
as well as in the question, W h a t  must I do, what am I bound 
to  do, being what I am? But this can only be if the thor- 
oughly active achieving character of personality in some way 
corresponds to and indeed expresses the essential character 
of Nature:  that it is not merely a level set geometric struc- 
ture available for analysis, but is itself a hierarchical activ- 
ity. T h e  more perfect anything is, the more reality it has and 
the more active it is. “It is as impossible for us to conceive 
God inactive as to conceive him non-existent.” T h e  gradual 
enlightenment of the sage would then be more than episodic; 
i t  would be rather an epitome or  the main theme of the cos- 
mos. Of this more serious estimate of morality and of this 
more active or should one say more dramatic conception of 
Nature there is no lack of evidence in Spinoza’s philosophy. 
I t  is not a concession to anthropomorphism; God is Nature, 
not a personality; we can have no human discourse with him. 
But  the achieving of perfection, the intelligent pursuit and 
realization of the good is in and of the constitution of Nature 
o r  God. “ H e  who loves God cannot strive that God should 
love him in return,” but man’s intellectual love of God is 
eternal, and “the very love of God with which God loves 
himself, not in so far  as he is infinite, but in so far  as he can 
be expressed through the essence of the human mind consid- 
ered under the species of eternity.’’ N o t  only mechanical, 
causal structures disclose the pattern or  constitution of Na-  
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ture ; enlightenment, achieving of perfection, spirit, activity 
also disclose it, and more deeply. “ H e  who clearly and dis- 
tinctly understands himself and his emotions loves God, and 
so much the more in proportion as he more understands 
himself and his emotions.” T h e  clear knowledge, Spinoza 
had written in the Short Treatise,  “comes, not from our be- 
ing convinced by reasons, but from our feeling and enjoying 
the thing itself,” and he further speaks of God as one and 
the same with Truth. Advance in intelligence is achievement 
of God. Spiritual activity is thus not only man’s life in God, 
but also God’s life in man; spiritual endeavor is cosmically 
important and significant, and intelligence, an index of the 
Ultimate. 
There is a higher naturalism in Spinoza revealing the 
meagre actualism of the lower. In reaction against crude 
anthropomorphism, he articulates a cosmology of factual 
structure. This is his geometry of the universe ; this is God 
or Nature. But alongside of Spinoza the positive scientist is 
Spinoza the sage, a hermit of reason wedded to perfection, 
pious with the piety of Nature. If the expression God or Na- 
ture sums up Spinoza’s geometry of the cosmos, that is to 
say, his knowledge, the wisdom of Spinoza, his religious- 
moral insight and mellow conviction requires the completing 
expression Nature  or God. These two elements in Spinoza’s 
philosophy are counteracting and complementary. Though 
we must analyze and explain in order to understand nature, 
yet it is not a fossil, frozen world-structure but a vital 
reality, and man’s own intelligence in its career is an index 
and an earnest of its plenitude of active character. Though 
structural analysis is the outstanding feature of Spinoza’s 
thought, dynamic finalism is its basic strain. The  repudiator 
of Divine Providence and anthropomorphic design in 
nature moves towards the idea of a deeper immanent tele- 
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ology, and the conviction of it is the pantheistic ground-note 
that sounds through the naturalism of Spinoza. Man’s ut- 
most of spiritual reach and moral endeavor is not futile or  
finally indifferent; in its best citizens the Commonwealth of 
Reality is attaining its own high emprise. “Be comforted,” 
Pascal heard the Savior say to him, “you would not seek me 
had you not found me. . . . Your conversion is my own con- 
cern. Fear  not and pray with confidence, as if for me.” Is 
the story told by the Persian sage JalSlud-din really differ- 
ent in purport? “One knocked a t  the Beloved’s door, and a 
voice asked from within, ‘Who is there?’ and he answered, 
‘It is I.’ Then the voice said, ‘This house will not hold me 
and thee.’ And the door was not opened. Then went the 
lover into the desert, and fasted and prayed in solitude. And 
after a year he returned and knocked again a t  the door. And 
again the voice asked, ‘Who is there?’ and he said, ‘It is 
Thyself I’  and the door was opened to him.” 
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